Tariffs in the spotlight: a tool for analysing trade conflicts

US president Donald Trump is keeping the world on tenterhooks with his erratic tariff policies. KOF has developed a trade model that can be used to calculate the consequences of increasing protectionism in various scenarios.

Tariffs usually harm the economy. Students of economics are taught this rule of thumb in the first semester of their degree programmes. But, as is so often the case, the devil is in the detail. Which country and which industry suffers the most, and are there any winners? Who comes through a trade dispute largely unscathed? And how can these effects be quantified?

The KOF trade model, which KOF’s co-director Hans Gersbach developed together with KOF economists Kieran James Walsh and Paul Maxence Maunoir, provides the answers. “The model maps the global trade links of almost 80 countries – not only at the end-product level but also at the supplier level across the entire supply chain,” explains Gersbach. “The model can analyse changes, shocks and trade diversions in these supply chains and calculate how companies adapt and how prices and production change,” he adds.

The model can adapt

Gersbach spent two-and-a-half years developing the KOF trade model and published the results as a working paper this spring. When he and his team began working on the model, it was not even foreseeable that the self-proclaimed tariff enthusiast Donald Trump would again become president of the United States. It is now available to help analyse his erratic tariff policies. This is because the model can adapt to all conceivable tariff rates, scenarios and constellations within a very short space of time.

“The basic motivation for developing this model was Switzerland’s position as a small, open economy with high exports and imports of both goods and services. The Swiss economy can be better understood by means of a trade model,” says Gersbach. The fact that this model can now be used as a tool for analysing the current tariff conflict is a side-effect.

Thousands of variables are incorporated into the model. A normal computer would quickly be overwhelmed, which is why the model requires slightly more than normal computing power. “A calculation run of a particular customs scenario took about a day,” explains Gersbach, “although we have since been able to reduce this time even further.”

The supreme discipline of economics

The model is a so-called quantitative general equilibrium model. This means that, at the end of the calculation process, supply and demand are in equilibrium on all markets owing to price adjustments. “In this model everything depends on everything else – including all feedback effects, but to varying degrees. Modelling this was and is the supreme discipline of economics,” explains Gersbach. The data basis for the model includes so-called input-output tables, which document the export and import relationships for raw materials, intermediate products and end-products of all countries.

But even such a complex model has clear limitations. “The model does not capture any self-reinforcing downward dynamic during economic crises or financial crises,” notes Gersbach. In addition, prices in reality are often rigid on the downside, which the model cannot take into account. Thirdly, the model neglects structural changes in investment activity over time, such as when uncertainty causes a reluctance to invest, as well as exchange-rate movements that go beyond the model and affect trade flows. And, finally, the model does not yet incorporate revenue from the introduction of tariffs.

The model’s results (so-called ‘first-layer’ effects) must therefore always be supplemented by a second level of analysis of the ‘second-layer’ effects outside the model environment. Depending on the scenario, these second-layer effects can either strengthen, significantly strengthen or, in some cases, weaken the impact of the first-layer effects.

The KOF trade model is described in detail in the KOF working paper entitled external page ‘Resilience of Small Open Economies to Geopolitical Shocks: The Case of Switzerland’.

Trump’s tariffs and their consequences

What if? Below are three political scenarios and their economic consequences for Switzerland based on KOF’s trade model. However, no claims are made about the probability of these scenarios actually occurring.

Scenario 1: Moderate losses of prosperity

The US imposes tariffs of 10 per cent on all imports and 30 per cent on China:
In this scenario the loss of prosperity for Switzerland would be moderate. Its loss of income in real terms would be 0.1 to 0.2 per cent per year. This loss of income can be seen more or less as a decline in gross domestic product (GDP). “That would hurt but would not be catastrophic,” explains Hans Gersbach. The pharmaceutical industry in Switzerland would be especially directly affected, although manufacturers of machinery, equipment, precision instruments, watches and foodstuffs, for example, would also be hit by these tariffs. In this scenario, however, we would still be a long way from an economic crisis. Nonetheless, this scenario also poses the risk of the above-mentioned second-layer effects (amplification effects), which increase with the duration and persistence of protectionist measures but remain fairly moderate in such a scenario. In a fragile global economy, however, even these effects can intensify further.

Scenario 2: New export opportunities

A serious trade conflict between China and the US involving very high reciprocal tariffs and export restrictions:
In this scenario the effect on Switzerland would be neutral in the short term. There would even be new export opportunities for Switzerland in sectors such as precision instruments. In the long run, however, Switzerland would also be hit hard by this conflict if supply chains were disrupted or American and Chinese demand for exports from Switzerland fell sharply because the downturn in these countries, especially the US, was so severe. In short, the second-layer effects would become increasingly significant the longer the conflict were to last. In this scenario the United States and China would primarily be hurting themselves, although America would suffer even more than China because the US is more heavily reliant on Chinese raw materials as well as on intermediate products and end-products from there. China’s share of US imports is well over 10 per cent on average in the case of intermediate products and is significantly higher for electronics. In addition, many Chinese intermediate products find their way to the US via other countries. In the short term, significant tariffs and other trade barriers cause economic harm, which typically intensifies when many countries are affected. The longer these tariffs last, the greater the impact of structural changes.

Scenario 3: A horror scenario looms

Decoupling between major economic blocs:
If two large economic blocs were to form around the US and China, which were hardly trading with each other, this would lead to an economic crisis if it were to happen quickly. Experts refer to this case as ‘decoupling’ or ‘Cold War 2.0’. “That would be a horror scenario,” says Gersbach. In this situation, Switzerland would face GDP losses in the order of 4 to 5 per cent per year, depending on the speed of such decoupling. This scenario could potentially give rise to an economic power sphere led by the United States and joined by the European Union, Norway, Switzerland and the non-EU G7 countries (Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom). These countries then impose significant trade barriers on exports from a second economic power sphere, namely China (including Taiwan and friendly states), which reacts in the same way. Countries outside these two spheres continue to trade without suffering any direct disruption but are affected indirectly. It is important to note that not all sectors lose out in the same way. For example, precision instruments and chemical products from Switzerland would be in greater demand in such a scenario. The extent of the absolute losses depends on how quickly decoupling happens.

Contacts

Prof. Dr. Hans Gersbach
Full Professor at the Department of Management, Technology, and Economics
Deputy head of KOF Swiss Economic Institute
  • LEE F 101
  • +41 44 632 82 80

Makroökonomie, Gersbach
Leonhardstrasse 21
8092 Zürich
Switzerland

Dr. Thomas Domjahn
  • LEE G 311
  • +41 44 632 53 44

KOF Bereich Zentrale Dienste
Leonhardstrasse 21
8092 Zürich
Switzerland

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